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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Petitioner, :
v.

:

DAVID E. BROWN,

:

Case No.

Category No. 2

Defendant-Respondent. :
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Whether the Utah Court of Appeals rendered a decision
in conflict with this Court's ruling in State v. Cintron, 680
P.2d 33 (Utah 1984) where this Court held that Theft is a crime
of dishonesty under Rule 609(a)(2), Utah Rules of Evidence?
OPINION BELOW
State v. David E. Brown, No. 870504-CA (April 4, 1989
Utah Ct. of App.) (See Addendum "A"; Opinion).
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This petition is from an opinion of the Utah Court of
Appeals filed April 4, 1989 affirming defendant's conviction of
Theft, a third degree felony, after a jury trial in the Third
Judicial District Court.

This Court has jurisdiction to consider

this petition under Utah Code Ann. S 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1988).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 609(a)t
(a) For the purpose of attacking the
credibility of a witness, evidence that he

has been convicted of a crime shall be
admitted if elicited from him or established
by public record during cross-examination but
only if the crime (1) was punishable by death
or imprisonment in excess of one year under
the law under which he was convicted, and the
court determines that the probative value of
admitting this evidence outweighs its
prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2)
involved dishonesty or false statement,
regardless of the punishment.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant-Respondent, David E. Brown, was charged with
Theft, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
S 76-6-404 (1978).

He was found guilty after a jury trial held

on September 16, 1987, in the Third Judicial District Court, in
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Pat B.
Brian, Judge, presiding.

The court sentenced defendant to serve

a term of zero to five years in the Utah State Prison and fined
defendant $5,000.

The court suspended the fine and prison term

and placed defendant on probation for eighteen months.

The Utah

Court of Appeals affirmed defendant's conviction in an opinion
filed April 4, 1989.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 28, 1987, defendant placed a case of cigarettes
in a shopping basket at a Farmer Jack's grocery store (R. 155, p.
55-57).

He casually pushed the basket up and down the aisles

until he eventually abandoned the basket and cigarettes and
walked out of the store (R. 155, p. 57-58).

Once outside,

defendant mounted his ten-speed bike and began riding around the
store parking lot while gazing through the store window (R. 155,
p. 58). The store manager, Dale Olson, observed defendant's odd
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activities and informed Gary Young, the store's security officer,
of defendant's suspicious behavior (R. 155, p. 58).
Defendant re-entered the store, grabbed the case of
cigarettes, and began to walk out of the store (R. 155, p. 59).
Mr. Young stopped defendant as he stepped out of the store (R.
155, p. 70). The case held 30 cartons of cigarettes valued at
$323 (R. 155, p. 60). Shortly thereafter, Officer Jo Ellen
Waymant of the Salt Lake Police Department arrived at the store
and arrested defendant (R. 155, p. 86).
Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion in limine to
exclude his prior misdemeanor theft convictions (R. 16-17).

The

trial court ruled that defendant's prior convictions were
admissible for the limited purpose of impeaching defendant (R.
155, p 15).

As a result, defendant chose not to testify at trial

(R. 155, p. 15). 1
On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals held that the
trial court erred in ruling that the prior theft convictions were
admissible under Rule 609(a)(2).

State v. Brown, No. 870504-CA,

slip op. at 3 (April 4, 1989, Utah Ct. of App.)
Opinion.)

(Addendum "A";

The court ruled that the offense of "theft is not

necessarily a crime involving dishonesty or false statement."
Id.

However, the court found that "the evidence was overwhelming

as to Brown's intent to steal the cigarettes" and they were not
convinced that a reasonable likelihood existed that Brown's

Because defendant's conviction occurred prior to this Court's
decision in State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1987), defendant
was not required to testify in order to preserve the impeachment
issue for appellate review.

testimony would have produced an acquittal.

I_d. at 4.

Thus, the

trial court's error in denying the motion in limine was found to
be harmless.

Id.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This Court should grant certiorari to review the Court
of Appeals ruling which ignores and contradicts a prior ruling by
this Court.

Specifically, the Court of Appeals determined that

the offense of Theft is not necessarily a crime involving
•'dishonesty" within the meaning of Rule 609(a)(2), Utah Rules of
Evidence.

The ruling contradicts this Court's opinion in State

v. Cintron, 680 P.2d 33, 34 (Utah 1984) where this Court held
under the previous Rules of Evidence that the offense of Theft
"obviously involves 'dishonesty.'"

Accordingly, this Court

should grant review to dispel the confused state of law.
ARGUMENT
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED A QUESTION OF
LAW IN CONFLICT WITH AN OPINION OF THIS
COURT.
Rule 43 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court
indicates that a Petition for Writ of certiorari may be sought
when "a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question of
state or federal law in a way that is in conflict with a decision
of this court."

In the present case, the Utah Court of Appeals

wholly ignored a legal precedent of this Court.
In State v. Brown, No. 870504-CA (April 4, 1989, Utah
Ct. App.), the Utah Court of Appeals found that the offense of
"theft is not necessarily a crime involving dishonesty or false
statement."

:id. at 3 (emphasis added) (Addendum "A"; Opinion.)
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Accordingly, the court held that defendant's prior misdemeanor
theft convictions were not admissible for impeachment purposes
under Rule 609(a) (2) , Utah Rules of Evidence.

Id.

Following its

reasoning in State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12, 17-18 (Utah App. 1988),
the court required that an inquiry be made into the particular
facts of the prior theft conviction to determine whether
dishonesty or false statement were involved in the commission of
the crime.

Brown at 2.

The decision of the Court of Appeals ignores and
contradicts this Court's opinion in State v. Cintron, 680 P.2d 33
(Utah 1984) where this Court unequivocally ruled that theft
"obviously involves 'dishonesty'" for purposes of impeachment
evidence.

Jkl. at 34; (Addendum "B"; Opinion).

Admittedly,

Cintron was based upon former Rule 21 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence, but was decided after the adoption of the new Rules of
Evidence in 1983.

Cintron, 680 P.2d at 34. However, this

Court's legal definition of the word "dishonesty" as including
the offense of Theft has not been abandoned and was cited as
controlling both to the trial court and to the Court of Appeals.
Regardless of this fact, the Court of Appeals failed to
distinguish or even cite the Cintron case in its opinion.

The

clear inference is that the Court of Appeals made a conscious and
silent departure from this Court's legal precedent.

Without

legal analysis, the Court of Appeals effectively rejected
Cintron.

In light of the confused state of law created by the

Court of Appeals decision, this Court should grant this Petition
for Writ of Certiorari and re-affirm the ruling in Cintron,

Other jurisdictions have similarly interpreted Rule
609(a)(2) to include theft offense as crimes involving dishonesty
for impeachment purposes.

United States v. Halbert, 668 F.2d

489, 495 (10th Cir. 1982), cert, denied, 456 U.S. 934 (1982);
United States v. Grandmont, 680 F.2d 867, 871 n.3 (1st Cir.
1982); United States v. Carden, 529 F.2d 443, 446 (5th Cir.
1976), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 848 (1976); United States v.
Bianco, 419 F.Supp. 507 (E.D.Pa. 1976), aff'd, 547 F.2d 1164 (3rd
Cir. 1977); State v. Brown, 111 Wash.2d 124, 761 P.2d 588 (1988),
rehearing granted, (Wash. 1/27/89); State v. Ruan, 419 N.W.2d
734, 738 (Iowa App. 1987); Alexander v. State, 611 P.2d 469, 476
(Alaska 1980); People v. Holman, 43 111.App.3d 56, 356 N.E.2d
1115, 1118 (1976); State v. Day, 91 N.M. 570, 577 P.2d 878, 884
(N.M. App. 1978); Commonwealth v. Campbell, 244 Pa.Super. 505,
368 A.2d 1299, 1301 (1976); James v. State, 274 Ark. 162, 622
S.W.2d 699 (1981); State v. Grover, 518 A.2d 1039, 1041 (Me.
1986); State v. Tolliver, 33 Ohio App.3d 110, 514 N.E.2d 922
(1986); State v. Stanifer, 382 N.W.2d 213, 218 (Minn.App. 1986);
State v. Gillies, 135 Ariz. 500, 662 P.2d 1007, 1014 (1983);
State v. Holtcamp, 614 S.W.2d 389 (Tenn.Cr.App. 1980); but see
United States v. Newman, 849 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1988); United
States v. Seamster, 568 F.2d 188 (10th Cir. 1978); State v.
Darveaux, 318 N.W.2d 44, 48 (Minn. 1982).
It should be further noted that this Court has three
cases presently under advisement which contain the same issue
decided by the Court of Appeals.

State v. Bruce, No. 860325;

State v. Johnson, No. 870096; State v. Lanier, No. 880101.
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To

avoid the possibility of seesaw jurisprudence, this Court should
grant review of the issue.

Otherwise, trial judges will be faced

with the difficulty of reconciling this Court's per curiam
Cintron decision with the conflicting Court of Appeals Brown
decision.
Additionally, this Court should grant review on the
basis that there is an apparent split between the Court of
Appeals judges on this issue.

In State v. Morehouse, 748 P.2d

217, 220 (Utah App. 1988), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah
1988), Judge Davidson, with Judge Bench concurring, declined to
reach the issue whether defendant was prejudiced by the trial
judge's ruling that Burglary and Theft were automatically
admissible under Rule 609(a)(2) as crimes of dishonesty.

In

contrast, Judge Jackson penned a strong dissent concluding that
the trial judge committed reversible error in admitting the prior
convictions,

^d. at 222. He resolved that ordinary theft crimes

are not crimes of dishonesty within the meaning of Rule
609(a)(2).

Id.
In State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12, 17-18 (Utah App. 1988),

Judge Greenwood, with Judge Billings concurring, found that Theft
crimes are not necessarily crimes of dishonesty without an
affirmative showing of fraud or deceit in the commission of the
crime.

IcL

Judge Garff, concurring in a separate opinion,

disagreed with the majority opinion.

.Id. at 20.

Following the

reasoning in Cintron, he determined that theft offenses are
fundamentally dishonest and should be automatically admitted for
impeachment purposes under Rule 609(a)(2) as a crime with
veracity-related elements.

Id. at 22.
-7-

Lastly, Judge Bench did not concur in the opinion in
the present case, but merely concurred in the result of affirming
the conviction.

Brown, slip op. at 5.

Thus, it appears that the

Court of Appeals legal conclusion on the issue is dependent on
the relative composition of the panel of judges.
Finally, this Court should grant review to establish
separate State analysis of State evidentiary rules independent of
federal interpretation of the federal counterpart.

If the

petition is granted, separate State analysis will be provided in
the State's brief.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing reasoning, petitioner
respectfully requests this Court to grant the Petition for Writ
/

of Certiorari.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

^ / ^ c i a y of April, 1989.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

DAN R. LARSEN
Assistant Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Petition for Writ of Certiorari were mailed,
postage prepaid, to Richard G. Uday, Frances M. Palacios, and
Joan Watt, attorneys for defendant, 424 East 500 South, Suite
300,

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this / V ^ T i a y of April, 1989.
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S t a t e of Utah,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

OPINION
(For Publication)

v.
David E. Brown,

Case No. 870504-CA

Defendant and Appellant.

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Pat B. Brian
Attorneys:

R. Paul Van Dam, Dan R. Larsen,
Salt Lake City, for Respondent
Frances M. Palacios, Joan C. Watt,
Richard G. Uday, Salt Lake City, for Appellant

Before Judges Bench, Billings and Greenwood.
GREENWOOD, Judge:
David E. Brown appeals from his conviction of theft, a
third degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404
(1978). We affirm.
On July 28, 1987, the store manager at a Farmer Jack's
grocery store saw Brown place a case containing thirty cartons
of cigarettes in a shopping cart. Brown pushed the cart up and
down the aisles then abandoned it and went out of the store.
He rode a ten-speed bicycle across the parking lot twice, while
looking through the store window. The store manager then
informed the store's security officer of Brown's activities and
they both continued to watch him. Brown reentered the store,
picked up the case of cigarettes and began to walk out of the
store. The security officer stopped Brown and police
subsequently arrested and charged him with theft*

Prior to trial, Brown filed a motion in limine to exclude
his prior misdemeanor theft convictions. The court ruled that
the prior convictions were admissible for the limited purpose
of impeaching Brown's credibility. However, at trial, Brown
did not testify and the convictions were not revealed. The
jury returned a guilty verdict. Brown filed a motion for a new
trial, asserting that during voir dire one juror failed to
reveal that he had had previous retail sales employment and
that one juror made a statement during a court recess which
indicated juror bias against Brown.
Brown claims on appeal that the trial court erred in
denying his motion to exclude evidence of his prior misdemeanor
theft convictions under Utah R. Evid. 609. We will not reverse
the trial court's rulings on evidentiary matters unless it is
"manifest that the trial court so abused its discretion that
there is a likelihood that injustice resulted." State v.
Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032, 1035 (Utah 1987). Utah R. Evid. 609(a)
states,
For the purpose of attacking the
credibility of a witness, evidence that he
has been convicted of a crime shall be
admitted if elicited from him or
established by public record during
cross-examination but only if the crime
(1) was punishable by death or
imprisonment in excess of one year under
the law under which he was convicted, and
the court determines that the probative
value of admitting this evidence outweighs
its prejudicial effect to the defendant,
or (2) involved dishonesty or false
statement, regardless of the punishment.
(Emphasis added.)
In State v. Wight. 765 P.2d 12, 17-18 (Utah Ct. App. 1988),
this court found that all crimes do not necessarily involve
dishonesty or false statement under 609(a)(2). In Wight, the
defendant had a prior conviction for aggravated robbery. This
court found that "the crime of robbery is not necessarily one
of dishonesty or false statement" and, therefore, that evidence
of a prior robbery conviction is not automatically admissible
under 609(a)(2). Ifl. at 18. We concluded that in order to
determine whether a criminal conviction is admissible under
609(a)(2), courts may inquire about the particular facts
involved to determine if dishonesty or false statement was
involved in the commission of the crime. Id. If dishonesty or
false statement was involved, evidence of the prior conviction
is admissible under 609(a)(2). id. Where no inquiry is made
870504-CA
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about the underlying facts, and the appellate court cannot
determine from the record if the prior crime involved
dishonesty or false statement, the 1 prior conviction is
inadmissible under 609(a)(2).
I&.
In this case, as in Wight, the court did not inquire as to
the facts of the prior misdemeanor theft convictions, the State
did not provide background information, and we cannot determine
if those convictions involved dishonesty or false statement for
purposes of 609(a)(2). In addition, for the same reasons as
those espoused in Wight, we find that theft is not necessarily
a crime involving dishonesty or false statement. Id.
Therefore, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion
in ruling that the prior theft convictions were admissible
under 609(a)(2).
Although the trial court erred in admitting Brown's prior
convictions, that error is reversible only if a review of the
record persuades us that without the error there was a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the
defendant. State v. Banner. 717 P.2d 1325, 1335 (Utah 1986),
In Banner, the court held that reversible error had occurred
where defendant's two prior convictions for assault with intent
to commit rape were admitted into evidence. Banner was charged
with committing sodomy on a child and sexual abuse of a child.
As a result of the trial court's decision to admit evidence of
the prior conviction, Banner decided not to testify. The Utah
Supreme Court found that the trial court erred in failing to
exclude the convictions because they were more prejudicial than
probative under 609(a)(1). Further, the court found that the
admission of the convictions was reversible error because
"[a]fter review of the record [it was] not convinced that had
defendant testified, the outcome in this case would necessarily
have been the same." Id.
In this case, witnesses at trial included the grocery store
manager, the store's security officer and the arresting police
officer. The manager testified that after Brown entered the
store for the second time, he retrieved the cigarettes from the
grocery cart where he had left them, walked quickly up the
aisle past the checkout stands to an exit door, activated the
door by stepping on the interior pad, and then stepped outside
the store. During cross-examination, the manager continued to
1. In Wight, we analyzed the facts under 609(a)(1) because the
prior crime was punishable by imprisonment in excess of one
year. !£. That section is not applicable in this case because
the prior convictions are for misdemeanors.

870504-CA
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assert that Brown had one foot outside the store when stopped
by the security officer. Similarly, the security officer
testified Brown was out of the store when apprehended. The
manager did not recall if Brown had said something to the
effect that he was not outside the store, while the security
officer thought such a statement might have been made. The
manager also testified he saw Brown put the cigarettes in the
grocery cart, exit the store, and ride his bike past the store
twice, while looking in the store window. We find that the
evidence was overwhelming as to Brown's intent to steal the
cigarettes and are not convinced that it is reasonably likely
that Brown's testimony would have produced an acquittal.
Therefore, the error in denying the motion in limine was
harmless.
Brown also claims the trial court erred by refusing to
grant a new trial because a juror had allegedly lied during
voir dire questioning and had made derogatory remarks about
Brown prior to jury deliberations. In McDonouoh Power
Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548 (1984), the United
States Supreme Court addressed the applicable test where a
juror had allegedly failed to disclose information during voir
dire questioning. The Court said,
We hold that to obtain a new trial in such
a situation, a party must first
demonstrate that a juror failed to answer
honestly a material question on voir dire,
and then further show that a correct
response would have provided a valid basis
for a challenge for cause.
464 U.S. at 556. In this case, the juror allegedly failed to
disclose that he had had retail experience. However, Brown
failed to prove that the juror actually had such experience and
further failed to demonstrate that there would have been "a
valid basis for challenge for cause."
In regard to the allegedly prejudicial remarks made by one
juror, the trial court met with the jury after receiving a note
from the jury. The trial court then further instructed the
jurors on their responsibilities. After the jury rendered its
verdict, the trial court polled each juror and asked whether
the verdict was influenced by anything other than properly
presented evidence and the court's instructions on the law.
Each juror responded appropriately. Further, after the motion
for a new trial was filed, the trial court found that the
alleged statements of one juror were "ambiguous and subject to
multiple interpretation" and that they did not constitute a
predetermination of guilt nor direct prejudice against Brown.
870504-CA
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The trial court's decision on a motion for a new trial is
largely within the court's discretion and will not be reversed
on appeal unless there is a clear abuse of that discretion.
State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 222 (Utah 1985). We find no
abuse of discretion in the trial court's refusal to grant a new
trial because of improper juror actions.
Affilmed.

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

I .CONCUR:

Judith M. Billings, Judge

I CONCUR IN THE RESULT:

Russell W. Bench, Judge

870504-CA
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ADDENDUM B

STATK v. CINTRON

Utah

33

Ctle M MO f 26 S3 (Utah l*M)

the officer's report was properly "sworn"
in the present case Mcknight involved
the validity of a sworn application filed
with the Statt> Land Board The affiant
signed the applications before a notary in
blank Later, on February 2, 1962, while
the affiant was in Denver, the applications
were completed by affiants agent and
presented to the notary, who notarized
them as "Subscribed and sworn to before
me this 2nd day of February. 1962 at Salt
Lake City, Utah " The Court found that
the affiant "did not subscribe and swear to
said applications on said date, but he did
confer with (the notary] by telephone at
various times on said date" about the applications 14 Utah 2d at 241, 381 P.2d at
72h
Relying on the Spongier case, the adversary contended that the oath was invalid
and therefore the applications were invalid.
In rejecting that contention, this Court specified the duties of the officer administering the oath: "(H]e is required to know and
state [that] the person who took the oath
did declare himself to be the person mentioned in the oath, and ... he manifested
an intention to be bound by it." 14 Utah
2d at 249. 381 P.2d at 733 Next, the Court
listed the essentials of an oath, as quoted
by the majority in this case Immediately
thereafter, the Court added this caution:
"The administration fof the oath] need
not follow any $et pattern. The ritual is
of secondary importance and does not
affect the validity of the oath" Id, 881
P.2d at 734 (emphasis added).
The administration of the oath in the
instant case met all of the requirements
defined in the Mc Knight case. If the oath
was proper on the facts of that case—as
this Court held—then the sworn statement
in this case is valid also.
To turn back the clock to the literal language in Spongier—as the majority d o e s exalts a technicality beyond all reasonable
limits and establishes a principle that will
haunt the administration of every criminal
and civil proceeding that relies on oaths or
sworn statements. Such a holding is unnecessary because subsequent opinions in

Mathews and Mcknight have erased that
technicality. It is unwise because it serves
no useful purpose. 1 would rely on our
most recent cases and affirm the judgment
of the district court.
STEWART, J., concurs in the dissenting
opinion of OAKS, J
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STATE of Utah. Plaintiff and
Respondent.
v.
Richard I. CINTRON. Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 19149.
Supreme Court of Utah.
March 7, 1984.
Defendant was convicted in the Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, James S.
Sawaya. J., of burglary and robbery, and
he appealed. The Supreme Court held
that: (1) an alleged accomplice's attorney's
suggestion that defendant's alibi witness
might have been the accomplice was within
the permissible area m which counsel legitimately could analyze and comment in his
argument to the jury; (2) the evidence sustained the conviction; and (3) there was no
error in requiring the defendant to answer
question as to a prior misdemeanor conviction involving theft.
Judgments and verdicts affirmed.
Oaks, J., concurred in the result.
1. Criminal Law 0720(5)
Alleged accomplice's attorney's suggestion that defendant's alibi witness may
have been the accomplice was within the
permissible area in which counsel legiti-
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mately could analyse and comment in his
argument to the jury.
t. Burglary *»41<1)
Robbery C24.1U)
Evidence was sufficient to sustain convictions for burglary and robbery'. U.C.A,
19S3, 7S-6-203, 76-6-302
Joseph C. Fratto, Jr., Salt Lake City, for
defendant and appellant.
David L Wilkinson, Atty Gen , Salt Lake
City, for plaintiff and respondent.
PER CURIAM
On appeal from jury verdicts of burglary
and robbery.1 defendant urges 1) misconduct of his accomplice's counsel in suggesting that defendant's "alibi" witness may
have been the accomplice, 2) insufficiency
of the evidence, and 3) error in requiring
answer as to a previous misdemeanor conviction
(1 ] Defendant was tried with an alleged
accomplice, one Joe Price In argument,
Prices attorney suggested that defendant's alibi witness may have been the accomplice This is well within the permissible area in which counsel legitimately can
analyze and comment in his argument to a
jury.1
(2] As to the second issue put on appeal, it., insufficiency of the evidence, the
following properly admitted evidence was
adduced at trial. At 8.-00 am on July 26,
1982, the victim was awakened and turned
on the kitchen lights, went to the back
door, and looked out on the well-lit porch.
There he saw a "Spanish-looking" young
man, who had come to the house three
times before, once to obtain gas for his car
and twice just "to talk." The victim would
not let the young man in the house. A
second, blond man kicked the door open,
knocking the victim down, and then jumped
on his back and head. The victim also
received a severe cut from a knife carried
by his assailant The victim heard the man
1. In violation of U CJL. 1953, H 76-t-20l and
76-6-302.

aay "Rick." which could have been a rtfer
tnce to the defendant, whose first name
was Richard.
After the police were notified, they apprehended defendant from the description
given The victim's brother-in-law also
identified the defendant as one who Canute his home for gas the same day the latter
sought gas from the victim, a few houses
away. On the day of arrest, the defendant
quickly was identified as the burglar in a
lineup. No objection is made to the composition of the lineup. The jury did not respond favorably to the defendant's alibi
evidence and he was convicted.
The other point raised on appeal, i.e..
error in requiring the defendant to answer
as to conviction of a prior "misdemeanor,"
was based on the interdiction in Rule 21.
Utah Rules of Evidence. That rule provides as follows:
Evidence of the conviction of a witness
for a crime not involving dishonesty or
false statement shall be inadmissible for
the purpose of impairing his credibility,
except as otherwise provided by statute
The misdemeanor to which the defendant
had to answer was a conviction in a justice
of the peace court for theft. The only
"otherwise" statute adverted to in the Rule
is that requiring answer to a prior commission of felony. Therefore, the only conviction for misdemeanor that would be admissible to test credibility would be one "involving dishonesty or false statement."
The prosecution correctly contends that impliedly theft is admissible since it obviously
involves "dishonesty." There was no error
in requiring the defendant to answer the
question.
The judgments and verdicts are affirmed.
OAKS, J., concurs in the result

1
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